TY - JOUR
T1 - Board gender quotas, female directors and corporate tax aggressiveness
T2 - a causal approach
AU - Garcia-Blandon, Josep
AU - Argilés-Bosch, Josep Maria
AU - Ravenda, Diego
AU - Castillo-Merino, David
N1 - Funding Information:
This research did not receive any specific grant from funding agencies in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2021
PY - 2022/1
Y1 - 2022/1
N2 - As a result of a mandatory board gender quota regulation, the percentage of female directors in Norway increased from around 5% in 2001 to over 40% in 2007, while it remained stable in neighbouring Denmark. Taking advantage of this unique research setting, this study implements a difference-in-differences approach to investigate the effects of the gender composition of the board of directors on corporate tax aggressiveness. Results indicate that the likelihood of corporate tax aggressive strategies increased in Norway after the appointment of many female directors, compared to the situation in Denmark. This finding is robust to a battery of sensitivity analyses and, in particular, to how corporate tax aggressiveness is measured. We interpret this result as caused by the way in which the incorporation of women to the boards was achieved, that is, through a mandatory board gender quota regulation. Possible implications of the findings are discussed.
AB - As a result of a mandatory board gender quota regulation, the percentage of female directors in Norway increased from around 5% in 2001 to over 40% in 2007, while it remained stable in neighbouring Denmark. Taking advantage of this unique research setting, this study implements a difference-in-differences approach to investigate the effects of the gender composition of the board of directors on corporate tax aggressiveness. Results indicate that the likelihood of corporate tax aggressive strategies increased in Norway after the appointment of many female directors, compared to the situation in Denmark. This finding is robust to a battery of sensitivity analyses and, in particular, to how corporate tax aggressiveness is measured. We interpret this result as caused by the way in which the incorporation of women to the boards was achieved, that is, through a mandatory board gender quota regulation. Possible implications of the findings are discussed.
KW - Difference-in-differences
KW - Female directors
KW - Gender quotas
KW - Tax aggressiveness
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85121756749&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - https://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcAuth=Alerting&SrcApp=Alerting&DestApp=WOS&DestLinkType=FullRecord;KeyUT=000752848000023
UR - http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14342/3896
U2 - 10.1016/j.irfa.2021.102010
DO - 10.1016/j.irfa.2021.102010
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85121756749
SN - 1057-5219
VL - 79
JO - International Review of Financial Analysis
JF - International Review of Financial Analysis
M1 - 102010
ER -