TY - JOUR
T1 - Equity Crowdfunding
T2 - High-Quality or Low-Quality Entrepreneurs?
AU - Blaseg, D.
AU - Cumming, Douglas
AU - Koetter, Michael
N1 - Funding Information:
This article is based on the doctoral dissertation of the first author at Goethe University Frankfurt. We are grateful to Editor Sophie Manigart and the entire anonymous review team for their excellent comments and guidance. We are grateful for feedback received from participants at the SFA conference, EntFin Lyon conference, and the P2P Financial Systems Bundesbank/SAFE/UCL conference as well as seminars at Goethe University Frankfurt. We owe thanks to many colleagues whose suggestions helped in the development of this manuscript and specifically want to thank Lars Hornuf, Christoph Siemroth, Armin Schwienbacher, Bernd Skiera, and Adalbert Winkler for their detailed feedback. The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Publisher Copyright:
© The Author(s) 2020.
PY - 2021/5
Y1 - 2021/5
N2 - Equity crowdfunding (ECF) has potential benefits that might be attractive to high-quality entrepreneurs, including fast access to a large pool of investors and obtaining feedback from the market. However, there are potential costs associated with ECF due to early public disclosure of entrepreneurial activities, communication costs with large pools of investors, and equity dilution that could discourage future equity investors; these costs suggest that ECF attracts low-quality entrepreneurs. In this paper, we hypothesize that entrepreneurs tied to more risky banks are more likely to be low-quality entrepreneurs and thus are more likely to use ECF. A large sample of ECF campaigns in Germany shows strong evidence that connections to distressed banks push entrepreneurs to use ECF. We find some evidence, albeit less robust, that entrepreneurs who can access other forms of equity are less likely to use ECF. Finally, the data indicate that entrepreneurs who access ECF are more likely to fail.
AB - Equity crowdfunding (ECF) has potential benefits that might be attractive to high-quality entrepreneurs, including fast access to a large pool of investors and obtaining feedback from the market. However, there are potential costs associated with ECF due to early public disclosure of entrepreneurial activities, communication costs with large pools of investors, and equity dilution that could discourage future equity investors; these costs suggest that ECF attracts low-quality entrepreneurs. In this paper, we hypothesize that entrepreneurs tied to more risky banks are more likely to be low-quality entrepreneurs and thus are more likely to use ECF. A large sample of ECF campaigns in Germany shows strong evidence that connections to distressed banks push entrepreneurs to use ECF. We find some evidence, albeit less robust, that entrepreneurs who can access other forms of equity are less likely to use ECF. Finally, the data indicate that entrepreneurs who access ECF are more likely to fail.
KW - adverse selection
KW - credit constraints
KW - entrepreneurial finance
KW - equity crowdfunding
KW - pecking order theory
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85078178888&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1177/1042258719899427
DO - 10.1177/1042258719899427
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85078178888
SN - 1042-2587
VL - 45
SP - 505
EP - 530
JO - Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice
JF - Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice
IS - 3
ER -