TY - JOUR
T1 - CEO selection in intergovernmental organizations
T2 - the clash between control and efficiency in governance
AU - Federo, Ryan
AU - Saz-Carranza, Angel
AU - Fernandez-í-Marin, Xavier
AU - Losada, Carlos
N1 - Funding Information:
We would like to thank Lino Cinquini for the editorial guidance and the two anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments and suggestions. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 2018 AOM Annual Meeting at Chicago, 2016 Political Economy of International Organizations Annual Conference at University of Utah, 2015 Business and Public Policy Workshop at ESMT Berlin, Germany, and 2015 Barcelona Workshop on Global Governance at ESADE Business School and Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals, Barcelona, Spain.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2021, The Author(s).
PY - 2023/3
Y1 - 2023/3
N2 - CEO selection is a crucial governance function influencing and driving the strategic direction of organizations. Extant research has largely assumed that boards are an efficient mechanism vested with the CEO selection function. However, boards are not always delegated with this function. In some organizations, the principals directly select the CEOs to keep effective control over the organization. Drawing on the clashing rationales of control and efficiency, this article identifies the factors influencing the governance choice of whether CEO selection is directly carried out by the principals or channeled through the board. Using a Bayesian logistic regression on a dataset of all global intergovernmental organizations, we find that the substantive character of ownership (i.e., capacity and incentive) matters more than the structure (i.e., diversity and dispersion) in such a governance choice. We also find that organizational characteristics barely have direct and moderating effects on the relationship between ownership structures and the governance choice of CEO selection. Our study has important implications for the literature on CEO selection, and strategic corporate governance research in general.
AB - CEO selection is a crucial governance function influencing and driving the strategic direction of organizations. Extant research has largely assumed that boards are an efficient mechanism vested with the CEO selection function. However, boards are not always delegated with this function. In some organizations, the principals directly select the CEOs to keep effective control over the organization. Drawing on the clashing rationales of control and efficiency, this article identifies the factors influencing the governance choice of whether CEO selection is directly carried out by the principals or channeled through the board. Using a Bayesian logistic regression on a dataset of all global intergovernmental organizations, we find that the substantive character of ownership (i.e., capacity and incentive) matters more than the structure (i.e., diversity and dispersion) in such a governance choice. We also find that organizational characteristics barely have direct and moderating effects on the relationship between ownership structures and the governance choice of CEO selection. Our study has important implications for the literature on CEO selection, and strategic corporate governance research in general.
KW - Bayesian statistics
KW - Board of directors
KW - CEO selection
KW - Control
KW - Efficiency
KW - Intergovernmental organizations
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85117709058&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s10997-021-09605-6
DO - 10.1007/s10997-021-09605-6
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85117709058
SN - 1385-3457
VL - 27
SP - 155
EP - 180
JO - Journal of Management and Governance
JF - Journal of Management and Governance
IS - 1
ER -