TY - JOUR
T1 - The political hourglass
T2 - opportunistic behavior in local government policy decisions
AU - Higuera-Molina, Emilio J.de la
AU - Esteve, M.
AU - Plata-Díaz, Ana M.
AU - Zafra-Gómez, José L.
N1 - Funding Information:
AGAUR (Agency for Management of University and Research Grants), Grant/Award Number: 2017-SGR-1556; Ministerio de Economía, Industria y Competitividad, Gobierno de España, Grant/Award Number: CSO2016-80823-P.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 The Author(s). Published with license by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.
PY - 2022
Y1 - 2022
N2 - The aim of this article is to determine whether there is opportunistic behavior in local government decisions related to contracting out, public-private partnership (PPP) and/or public externalization. Analysis of the results obtained from applying a fixed effects panel data model to a sample of 2,274 Spanish municipalities supports the existence of asymmetric opportunistic behavior. Specifically, there is strong evidence that in preelection years, there is less likelihood of contracting out and PPP decisions being approved, and a greater probability of public externalization taking place. In post-election years, an increase in capital spending is associated with a lower probability of contracting out and of PPP. An increase in current spending in preelection years reduces the probability of decisions being taken on contracting out and PPP. These empirical results highlight the extent of opportunistic behavior in selecting management forms for the delivery of local government services.
AB - The aim of this article is to determine whether there is opportunistic behavior in local government decisions related to contracting out, public-private partnership (PPP) and/or public externalization. Analysis of the results obtained from applying a fixed effects panel data model to a sample of 2,274 Spanish municipalities supports the existence of asymmetric opportunistic behavior. Specifically, there is strong evidence that in preelection years, there is less likelihood of contracting out and PPP decisions being approved, and a greater probability of public externalization taking place. In post-election years, an increase in capital spending is associated with a lower probability of contracting out and of PPP. An increase in current spending in preelection years reduces the probability of decisions being taken on contracting out and PPP. These empirical results highlight the extent of opportunistic behavior in selecting management forms for the delivery of local government services.
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85104268798
UR - http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14342/5010
U2 - 10.1080/10967494.2021.1905117
DO - 10.1080/10967494.2021.1905117
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85104268798
SN - 1096-7494
VL - 25
SP - 767
EP - 784
JO - International Public Management Journal
JF - International Public Management Journal
IS - 5
ER -