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Private regulation, public policy, and the perils of adverse ontological selection

  • J. Grabs*
  • , Graeme Auld
  • , Benjamin Cashore
  • *Autor/a de correspondencia de este trabajo

Producción científica: Artículo en revista indizadaArtículorevisión exhaustiva

41 Citas (Scopus)

Resumen

What problems can private regulatory governance solve, and what role should public policy play? Despite access to the same empirical evidence, the current scholarship on private governance offers widely divergent answers to these questions. Through a critical review, this paper details five ontologically distinct academic logics – calculated strategic behavior; learning and experimentalist processes; political institutionalism; global value chain and convention theory; and neo-Gramscian accounts – that offer divergent conclusions based on the particular facets of private governance they illuminate, while ignoring those they obfuscate. In this crowded marketplace of ideas, scholars and practitioners are in danger of adverse ontological selection whereby certain approaches and insights are systematically ignored and certain problem conceptions are prioritized over others. As a corrective, we encourage scholars to make their assumptions explicit, and occasionally switch between logics, to better understand private governance's problem-solving potential and its interactions with public policy.

Idioma originalInglés
Páginas (desde-hasta)1183-1208
Número de páginas26
PublicaciónRegulation and Governance
Volumen15
N.º4
DOI
EstadoPublicada - oct 2021
Publicado de forma externa

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