Legal "neutral dialogue", implementing the work of Bruce Ackerman in the field of law

This legal theory paper deals from a strictly jus philosophical perspective with the work of Bruce Ackerman and relates to the configuration of a theory of neutral dialogue applied in the field of law .The core of this essay is the analysis and complementation of some of the characteristics of this Ackerman's theory with other less abstract theories such as Prakken's formal model of adjudication, Walton's and Krabbe's commitment in dialogue, and Sartor's double face of legal concepts. The major and long term purpose is to achieve a feasible and comprehensible notion of neutral dialogue among these different notions. The more realistic and immediate goal is to provide theoretical data to a more general and multidisciplinary notion of hybrid dialogue. This paper aims to supply legal theoretical background to empirical fields such as the Online Dispute Resolution and Relational Justice. The final thesis of this article is to state that neutrality does not necessarily means denaturalized of the arguments used by parties in law and politics.