Resumen
We study optimal contracts in a simple model where employees are averse to inequity, as modeled by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). A "selfish" employer can profitably exploit envy or guilt by offering contracts which create inequity off-equilibrium, i.e., when employees do not meet his demands. Such contracts resemble team and relative performance contracts. We derive conditions for inequity aversion to be in itself a reason to form work teams of distributionally concerned employees, even in situations in which effort is contractible.
Idioma original | Inglés |
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Páginas (desde-hasta) | 297-320 |
Número de páginas | 24 |
Publicación | Scandinavian Journal of Economics |
Volumen | 110 |
N.º | 2 |
DOI | |
Estado | Publicada - jun 2008 |
Publicado de forma externa | Sí |