The opponents to board gender quotas point out the utility argument, according to which, the impossibility of appointing the best candidates will have a negative impact on firm performance. Norway is the case study to investigate the impact of board gender quota regulations on firm performance. Because a gender quota was voluntary from 2004 to 2006 and mandatory afterwards, it allows us to investigate the respective impact of voluntary and mandatory gender quota regulations. The research design takes advantage of this unique research setting and implements difference-in-differences estimations. Previous studies examining the Norwegian context, however, do not differentiate between the voluntary and mandatory implementation of the quota. After controlling for several methodological issues that were unnoticed by these studies, we report sound evidence that the Norwegian quota did not have any negative impact on firm performance. Furthermore, results also suggest that when the quota was applied voluntarily, it had some positive effects on performance. These findings contradict most of the extant evidence and have interesting implications.