Does uncertainty lead to sincerity? Simple and complex voting mechanisms

Miguel Ángel Ballester, Pedro Rey-Biel

Producción científica: Artículo en revista indizadaArtículorevisión exhaustiva

7 Citas (Scopus)

Resumen

We ask whether the absence of information about other voters' preferences allows optimal voting to be interpreted as sincere.We start by classifying voting mechanisms as simple and complex according to the number of message types voters can use to elect alternatives. We show that while in simple voting mechanisms the elimination of information about other voters' preferences allows optimal voting to be interpreted as sincere, this is no longer always true for complex ones. In complex voting mechanisms, voters' optimal strategy may vary with the size of the electorate. Therefore, in order to interpret optimal voting as sincere for complex voting mechanisms, we describe the optimal voting strategy when voters not only have no information but also have no pivotal power, i.e., as the size of the electorate tends to infinity.

Idioma originalInglés
Páginas (desde-hasta)477-494
Número de páginas18
PublicaciónSocial Choice and Welfare
Volumen33
N.º3
DOI
EstadoPublicada - 2009
Publicado de forma externa

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