The boards of international governmental organizations: Resource providers or delegated controllers?

Ryan Acosta Federo, Xavier Fernández Marín, Angel Saz Carranza, Carlos Losada Marrodán

Research output: Conference paperContribution

Abstract

In understanding what determines the executive board structure of International Governmental Organizations (IGOs), we find that the number of members is a central driver. This article applies Corporate Governance literature to the Executive Boards of IGOs. We operatonalize the characteristics of IGO Executive Boards (number of directors, director selection, director requirements, and board decisión-making) and test various hypotheses involving independent variables related to the IGO (membership, size, age, UN-affiliated, and being a Financial Institution). A main finding is that IGOs with greater number of members will adopt majority voting rules, have larger boards, and enjoy greater capacities.
Original languageEnglish
Publication statusPublished - 7 Jan 2016
Event9th Annual Conference on the Political Economy of International Organizations -
Duration: 7 Jan 20169 Jan 2016

Conference

Conference9th Annual Conference on the Political Economy of International Organizations
Period7/01/169/01/16

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