Abstract
The NATO war in Kosovo did not come out of the blue. The alliance fought only after Belgrade turned a deaf ear to diplomacy, and NATO knew the risks it was running. But doing nothing would have been worse; assenting to Slobodan Milosevic's mass killings would have dangerously undermined the credibility of Western institutions.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 114-120 |
| Number of pages | 8 |
| Journal | Foreign Affairs |
| Volume | 78 |
| Issue number | 6 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Nov 1999 |
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