Failure of an exchange-rate-based stabilization plan in Turkey

Giyas Gökkent, Carlos Moslares, Rafael Amiel-Saenz

Research output: Indexed journal article Articlepeer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The Turkish exchange-rate-based stabilization plan adopted in 2000 has been a spectacular failure, lasting a mere fourteen months despite a relatively flexible peg regime and preannounced exit strategy. The final three months of the currency regime were marred by the eruption of a banking sector crisis that quickly developed into a currency crisis, quelled only by external loans and a blanket guarantee by the sovereign of all banking sector liabilities. This was ultimately to no avail as the lira was allowed to float following a fill-fledged currency crisis in late February 2001. The usual indicators of crisis did not point to imminent turmoil in November 2000 despite widespread concern about eventual dire developments. To identify the source of the November crisis, one must weigh the factors that led economic agents, and banks in particular, to expect higher interest rates after the fall.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)35-67
Number of pages33
JournalEastern European Economics
Volume41
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2003

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