TY - JOUR
T1 - The role of role uncertainty in modified dictator games
AU - Iriberri, Nagore
AU - Rey-Biel, P.
N1 - Funding Information:
Acknowledgements We thank Miguel A. Ballester, Gary Charness, Rosemarie Nagel, Joel Sobel, Car-mit Segal and editor and two anonymous referees for their comments. We are grateful to Aniol Llorente-Saguer and Natalia Montinari for their help in running the experiments. Nagore Iriberri acknowledges financial support from Fundación Rafael del Pino, Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia (ECO2009-11213 and SEJ2007-64340) and the support of the Barcelona GSE Research Network and the Government of Catalonia. Pedro Rey-Biel acknowledges financial support from Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnologia (ECON2009-0716 and Consolider-Ingenio CSD2006-00016) and the Barcelona GSE Research Network and of the Government of Catalonia (2009SGR-00169).
PY - 2011/5
Y1 - 2011/5
N2 - We compare behavior in modified dictator games with and without role uncertainty. Subjects choose between a selfish action, a costly surplus creating action (altruistic behavior) and a costly surplus destroying action (spiteful behavior). While costly surplus creating actions are the most frequent under role uncertainty (64%), selfish actions become the most frequent without role uncertainty (69%). Also, the frequency of surplus destroying choices is negligible with role uncertainty (1%) but not so without it (11%). A classification of subjects into four different types of interdependent preferences (Selfish, Social Welfare maximizing, Inequity Averse and Competitive) shows that the use of role uncertainty overestimates the prevalence of Social Welfare maximizing preferences in the subject population (from 74% with role uncertainty to 21% without it) and underestimates Selfish and Inequity Averse preferences. An additional treatment, in which subjects undertake an understanding test before participating in the experiment with role uncertainty, shows that the vast majority of subjects (93%) correctly understand the payoff mechanism with role uncertainty, but yet surplus creating actions were most frequent. Our results warn against the use of role uncertainty in experiments that aim to measure the prevalence of interdependent preferences.
AB - We compare behavior in modified dictator games with and without role uncertainty. Subjects choose between a selfish action, a costly surplus creating action (altruistic behavior) and a costly surplus destroying action (spiteful behavior). While costly surplus creating actions are the most frequent under role uncertainty (64%), selfish actions become the most frequent without role uncertainty (69%). Also, the frequency of surplus destroying choices is negligible with role uncertainty (1%) but not so without it (11%). A classification of subjects into four different types of interdependent preferences (Selfish, Social Welfare maximizing, Inequity Averse and Competitive) shows that the use of role uncertainty overestimates the prevalence of Social Welfare maximizing preferences in the subject population (from 74% with role uncertainty to 21% without it) and underestimates Selfish and Inequity Averse preferences. An additional treatment, in which subjects undertake an understanding test before participating in the experiment with role uncertainty, shows that the vast majority of subjects (93%) correctly understand the payoff mechanism with role uncertainty, but yet surplus creating actions were most frequent. Our results warn against the use of role uncertainty in experiments that aim to measure the prevalence of interdependent preferences.
KW - Experiments
KW - Inequity aversion
KW - Interdependent preferences
KW - Mixture-of-types models
KW - Role reversal
KW - Role uncertainty
KW - Social welfare maximizing
KW - Strategy method
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=79958845100&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/s10683-010-9261-5
DO - 10.1007/s10683-010-9261-5
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:79958845100
SN - 1386-4157
VL - 14
SP - 160
EP - 180
JO - Experimental Economics
JF - Experimental Economics
IS - 2
ER -