The boards of international governmental organizations: Delegated controllers, resource providers, or efficiency maximizers?

Ryan Federo, Xavier Fernández, Angel Saz Carranza, Carlos Losada Marrodán

Producció científica: Contribució a una conferènciaContribució

Resum

In understanding what determines the board design of International Governmental Organizations (IGOs), we find that the organizational characteristics are central drivers. This article explores board design determinants by testing hypotheses derived from the Corporate Governance and International Relations literatures. We operationalize the characteristics of IGOs (membership, size, age, and being an International Financial Institution) and their boards (number of directors, director requirements, board duties). Key findings are: IGOs with greater number of members have smaller boards; older IGOs and those with large budgets demand more requirements from their prospective board directors; IGOs with smaller budgets and older IGOs have boards withmore duties and capacities. Overall, the mechanisms of coordination costs, resourcefulness, and delegation seem all at play.
Idioma originalAnglès
Estat de la publicacióPublicada - 1 de gen. 2016
Esdeveniment9th Annual Conference on the Political Economy of International Organizations -
Durada: 7 de gen. 20169 de gen. 2016

Conferència

Conferència9th Annual Conference on the Political Economy of International Organizations
Període7/01/169/01/16

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