Relationships, Authority, and Reasons: A Second-Personal Account of Corporate Moral Agency

Alan D. Morrison, Rita Mota, William J. Wilhelm

Producció científica: Article en revista indexadaArticleAvaluat per experts

4 Cites (Scopus)


We present a second-personal account of corporate moral agency. This approach is in contrast to the first-personal approach adopted in much of the existing literature, which concentrates on the corporation's ability to identify moral reasons for itself. Our account treats relationships and communications as the fundamental building blocks of moral agency. The second-personal account rests on a framework developed by Darwall. Its central requirement is that corporations be capable of recognizing the authority relations that they have with other moral agents. We discuss the relevance of corporate affect, corporate communications, and corporate culture to the second-personal account. The second-personal account yields a new way to specify first-personal criteria for moral agency, and it generates fresh insights into the reasons those criteria matter. In addition, a second-personal analysis implies that moral agency is partly a matter of policy, and it provides a fresh perspective on corporate punishment.
Idioma originalAnglès
Número d’articlePII S1052150X2100018X
Pàgines (de-a)322-347
Nombre de pàgines26
RevistaBusiness Ethics Quarterly
Data online anticipadade jul. 2021
Estat de la publicacióPublicada - d’abr. 2022
Publicat externament


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