Migration and sovereign default risk

George Alessandria, Yan Bai*, Minjie Deng

*Autor corresponent d’aquest treball

Producció científica: Article en revista indexadaArticleAvaluat per experts

12 Cites (Scopus)

Resum

During sovereign debt crises, countries experience persistent economic declines, spiking spreads, and outflows of capital and workers. To account for these salient features, we develop a sovereign default model with migration and capital accumulation. The model has a two-way feedback. Default risk lowers workers’ welfare and induces emigration, which in turn intensifies default risk by lowering tax base and investment. Compared with a no-migration model, our model produces higher default risk, lower investment, and a more profound and prolonged recession. We find that migration accounts for almost all of the lack of recovery in GDP during the recent Spanish debt crisis.

Idioma originalAnglès
Pàgines (de-a)1-22
Nombre de pàgines22
RevistaJournal of Monetary Economics
Volum113
DOIs
Estat de la publicacióPublicada - d’ag. 2020
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