La dosis de prueba: entre el common law y el civil law

Xavier Abel Lluch

Producció científica: Article en revista no indexadaArticle


The judicial decision is based on a level of sufficiency of evidence. In common law systems there are two standards of proof. On the one hand, beyond any reasonable doubt, based on the principle that it is preferable to acquit many guilty people rather than condemning one innocent person. It is used with the wording beyond any reasonable doubt or satisfied so that you feel sure, and the courts emphazise that the wording is not as important, as the jury's degree of conviction about the culpability of the accused. On the other hand, the preponderance of evidence, also known as the balance of probabilities, used in civil actions, affirms that faced with different hypotheses the one with the highest degree of logical confirmations must prevail (more probable than not). The civil law system does not have an equivalent to the standards of evidence, and they refer to the rules of assessing evidence, especially "reasonable judgment", understood as a system of free and reasoned assessment. There are also some case law constructions, such as in the criminal courts, which require minimum proof of guilt or the coefficient of the flexibility of the evidence. Both standards and rules of assessing evidence must be conceived as mechanisms that allow for a subjective decision-making process that is more objective and rational.
Idioma originalAnglès
Publicació especialitzadaDoxa: Cuadernos de filosofía del derecho
Estat de la publicacióPublicada - 1 de juny 2013


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