Goal tolerance, outside investors, and family firm governance

Harry Sapienza, Jaume Villanueva Aguila

Producció científica: Article en revista indexadaArticleAvaluat per experts

41 Cites (Scopus)


Le Breton-Miller and Miller argue that as the family becomes more embedded in the firm, the firm's decision makers become more susceptible to influence by the family, and agency problems rise for outside investors. We contend that the family's embeddedness in the business does not, in itself, explain whether the assumptions of agency theory are warranted. Our commentary offers an alternative way in which outside investors might look at family firms' goals. Outsiders should assess the complementarity of the family firm's objectives with their own if they are to make rewarding investments in family firms.
Idioma originalAnglès
Pàgines (de-a)1193-1199
RevistaEntrepreneurship: Theory and Practice
Estat de la publicacióPublicada - 1 de nov. 2009


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