Dynamic capabilities: The role of board monitoring and managerial incentives

Aman Asija, Dimo Ringov

Producció científica: Article en revista indexadaArticleAvaluat per experts

5 Cites (Scopus)

Resum

Research on the nature and value of firms’ dynamic capabilities has produced contradictory propositions and findings. Scholars have argued that contingency theorizing has the potential to improve our understanding, as the context in which dynamic capabilities are deployed may affect their value. Drawing on agency theory, we propose that corporate governance mechanisms play a significant role in determining the value of firms’ dynamic capabilities. In particular, we develop theoretical propositions about the differential effect of two corporate governance mechanisms—board monitoring and managerial incentives—on the value of dynamic capabilities in the form of complex codified routines, on one hand, and simple rules, on the other hand, at different levels of environmental dynamism.

Idioma originalAnglès
Pàgines (de-a)268-280
Nombre de pàgines13
RevistaBRQ Business Research Quarterly
Volum24
Número4
DOIs
Estat de la publicacióPublicada - 2020
Publicat externament

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