@article{0d22f6509a9d47aa90a347b70ec6a1ee,
title = "Common ownership, corporate control and price competition",
abstract = "We examine price competition with homogeneous products in the presence of general common ownership arrangements allowing for different corporate control structures. We show that equilibria with positive profits exist (including the monopoly outcome) when the manager places the same weight on the profit of her firm as on the average profit of all the other firms. This condition supports symmetric and asymmetric stakes and can arise as an equilibrium of a network formation game or a bargaining process.",
keywords = "Bertrand competition, Minority shareholders, Partial ownership, Proportional control, Silent financial interests",
author = "A. Bayona and L{\'o}pez, {{\'A}ngel L.} and Manganelli, {Anton Giulio}",
note = "Funding Information: We thank two anonymous referees, Joseph Harrington, Sjaak Hurkens, Gerard Llobet, Konstantinos Papadopoulos, Martin Schmalz, Geert Van Moer, and the participants to the 2021 CRESSE Conference on “Advances in the Analysis of Competition Policy and Regulation”, the 46th Simposio de la Asociaci{\'o}n Espa{\~n}ola de Econom{\'i}a-Spanish Economic Association, the 2022 Annual conference of the Mannheim Centre for Competition and Innovation, and the 2022 workshop on ”Diversified Institutional Ownership and Firms{\textquoteright} Strategic Behavior: causal effects and mechanisms” for their insightful comments. Bayona acknowledges the financial support from Banc Sabadell, the Generalitat de Catalunya (AGAUR grant 2017 SGR 640), and the Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities (Grant: PGC2018-098670). L{\'o}pez acknowledges the financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation through grant PID2021-128430NB-I00, and through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (CEX2019-000915-S), and from AGAUR under 2017 SGR 1301. Funding Information: We thank two anonymous referees, Joseph Harrington, Sjaak Hurkens, Gerard Llobet, Konstantinos Papadopoulos, Martin Schmalz, Geert Van Moer, and the participants to the 2021 CRESSE Conference on “Advances in the Analysis of Competition Policy and Regulation” , the 46th Simposio de la Asociaci{\'o}n Espa{\~n}ola de Econom{\'i}a-Spanish Economic Association, the 2022 Annual conference of the Mannheim Centre for Competition and Innovation, and the 2022 workshop on ”Diversified Institutional Ownership and Firms{\textquoteright} Strategic Behavior: causal effects and mechanisms” for their insightful comments. Bayona acknowledges the financial support from Banc Sabadell, the Generalitat de Catalunya (AGAUR grant 2017 SGR 640 ), and the Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities (Grant: PGC2018-098670). L{\'o}pez acknowledges the financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation through grant PID2021-128430NB-I00, and through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (CEX2019-000915-S), and from AGAUR under 2017 SGR 1301. Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2022 Elsevier B.V.",
year = "2022",
month = aug,
doi = "10.1016/j.jebo.2022.06.032",
language = "English",
volume = "200",
pages = "1066--1075",
journal = "Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization",
issn = "0167-2681",
publisher = "Elsevier B.V.",
}